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MAINE LAW REVIEW
STANDARDS OF REVIEW: THE MEANING
OF WORDS
Michael R. Bosse*
Human reason has this peculiar fate that in one species of its
knowledge it is burdened by questions which, as prescribed by
the very nature of reason itself, it is not able to ignore, but
which, as transcending all its powers, it is also not able to
answer.
1
- Immanuel Kant
The way to gain a liberal view of your subject is not to read
something else, but to get to the bottom of the subject itself.2
- Oliver Wendell Holmes
I. INTRODUCTION
Standards of review are both theoretically and practically impor-
tant, yet they often are ignored by both lawyers and judges.' They
provide functional definitions of the advocate's scope of appeal,4 the
power of a reviewing court to rule on that appeal, and, depending
* Law Clerk for Justice Robert W. Clifford, Maine Supreme Judicial Court; J.D.,
University of Maine School of Law, 1996; B.A., Bates College, 1993. My thanks to
Julie Brady, Justice Robert Clifford, Chip Mason, and Professor Melvyn Zarr for
reading and editing drafts of this Article. Their assistance was invaluable.
1. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON at vii (Norman Kemp Smith
trans., Macmillan & Co. 1965) (n.d.).
2. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 476
(1897).
3. They are not ignored in legal scholarship, and several articles and books have
canvassed the subject of standards of review. See; e.g., FRANK M. COMN, ON AP.
PEAL 266-67 (1994) (discussing abuse of discretion); Patrick W. Brennan, Standards
of Appellate Review, 33 DEF. LJ. 377 (1984); Steven Alan Childress, Standards of
Review in Eleventh Circuit Civil Appeals, 9 NovA LJ. 257 (1985); Edward H.
Cooper, Civil Rule 52(a): Rationing and Rationalizing the Resources of Appellate
Review, 63 NoTRE DAMp- L. Rv. 645 (1988); Ronald R. Hofer, Standards of Re-
view-Looking Beyond the Labels, 74 MARQ. L. REv. 231 (1991); Judge Norman H.
Jackson, Utah Standards of Appellate Review, 7 UTAH B.J. 9 (1994); Martin B. Louis,
Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between the Trial and Appellate
Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, the Judge-Jury Question, and Proce-
dural Discretion, 64 N.C. L. REv. 993 (1986); Calvert Magruder, The Trials and Trib-
ulations of an Intermediate Appellate Court, 44 CoRN.LL L.Q. 1 (1958); Honorable
John F. Nangle, The Ever Widening Scope of Fact Review in Federal Appellate
Courts-Is the "Clearly Erroneous Rule" Being Avoided?, 59 WASH. U. L.Q. 409
(1981); Maurice Rosenberg, Appellate Review of Trial Court Discretion, 79 F.R.D.
173 (1975); Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from
Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 635 (1971).
4. See Honorable J. Dickson Phillips, Jr., The Appellate Review Function: Scope
of Review, LAw & Comrmp. PRoBs., Spring 1984, at 1, 1.
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upon the standard of review utilized, an influence on the outcome of
an issue. Because they define the framework for an appeal and an
appellate court's approach to certain issues, standards of review are
important tools for both bench and bar.5 The question of whether a
trial court clearly erred or abused its discretion6 is not the same de-
termination as whether the court was simply wrong. By contrast, on
a de novo review of an issue of law, the United States Supreme
Court could unanimously reverse a unanimous en banc circuit court
of appeal's ruling. A de novo standard of review allows a court to
do precisely what it is not permitted to do when the standard of
review is deferential. Standards of review are a fertile ground for
advocacy.7
5. Despite what some advocates might believe, standards of review can be ex-
tremely important to courts. In response to the government's failure to mention the
standard of review in anything more than a soundbite in its brief, Judge Posner is-
sued this response:
We are not fetishistic about standards of appellate review. We acknowl-
edge that there are more verbal formulas for the scope of appellate review
(plenary or de novo, clearly erroneous, abuse of discretion, substantial evi-
dence, arbitrary and capricious, some evidence, reasonable basis, presumed
correct, and maybe others) than there are distinctions actually capable of
being drawn in the practice of appellate review. But even if, as we have
sometimes heretically suggested, there are operationally only two degrees
of review, plenary (that is, no deference given to the tribunal being re-
viewed) and deferential, that distinction at least is a feasible, intelligible,
and important one.
United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 239, 242 (7th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
6. I have omitted from this Article any discussion of a trial court's discretion and
appellate court determinations of abuse of that discretion. Although abuse of dis-
cretion is an important standard of review for the practitioner, the topic lends itself
to separate treatment from the identification and labeling of issues as "factual" or
"legal" and the consequent use of either a de novo or clear error standard.
7. See Sean T. Carnathan & Karen D. Kemble, Hints on Writing Law Court
Briefs From Some People Who Read Them, 9 ME. BJ. 318, 319 (1994) (noting im-
portance of identification and utilization of standards of review in briefs before the
Law Court); John C. Godbold, 7venty Pages and 7enry Minutes-Effective Advo-
cacy on Appeal, in APPELLATE ADVOCACy 63, 64 (Peter J. Carre et al. eds., 1981)
(noting that the standard of review is the "measuring stick" for the appellate judge);
W. Wendell Hall, Standards of Appellate Review in CivilAppeals, 21 ST. MARY's I4.
865, 867-68 (1990) ("Because the appropriate standard of review will control the
outcome of an appeal, appellate practitioners must consider the standard of review
with the same thoughtful consideration that they give to the facts and the substan-
tive law."); Jeff Leavell, Appellate Review: Choosing and Shaping the Proper Stan-
dard, 60 Wis. B. BuL.. 14, 15 (1987) ("[U]nderstanding the standards of review will
permit the lawyer to advocate the standard most favorable to the lawyer's posi-
tion."). Hall states:
There is nothing to be gained by avoiding the standard of review. The
appellate practitioner who ignores the standard loses credibility with the
reviewing court. If an appellate practitioner does not identify the relevant
standard and vigorously approach the standard in his brief, he leaves a void
in his brief which will be filled by his adversary, the reviewing court, or the
court's clerks.
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Many practical reasons exist for an analysis and thorough study of
standards of review. To understand and to know what standards of
review apply is important to the practitioner in Maine for two rea-
sons: first, to know whether an appeal is likely to be successful, and
second, to argue that appeal.8 The practitioner should spend more
time arguing her choice for the standard of review in her brief. She
should pay attention to precedent but also heed policy. Doing so
will either expose areas for argument or counsel against an appeal.
When a real question over a standard of review exists, and lawyers
have done extensive analysis in their briefs, appellate courts should
explicitly examine the various policy rationales and decide the ap-
propriate standard of review to both encourage meritorious appeals
and discourage appeals that stretch or distort the function of the
reviewing court.
Standards of review are widely understood to be based on
whether the issue "is" one of "fact" or "law."9 If an issue is deemed
Hall, supra at 868.
8. A Maine Supreme Judicial Court Justice has recently made this point. Justice
Dana noted:
In my former life, long after I took the appeal, I would send an associate to
the library to look ... [the standard of review] up. Waiting that long is
usually a big mistake. It is better than never, but I would encourage all of
you to fully understand the standard of review as early as possible-prefer-
ably before you decide to appeal... if you are representing a civil litigant
whose chances of prevailing are one in four, and the client is going to have
to pay you either way, at least the client ought to make an informed expen-
diture of its resources.
Honorable Howard H. Dana, Jr. & Honorable Andrew M. Mead, Effective Trial and
Appellate Advocacy Tips From the Bench, 10 ME. B.J. 24, 26 (1995).
9. This dichotomy is reflected in Maine law. See Collins v. Trius, Inc., 663 A.2d
570, 572 (Me. 1995) (questions of law reviewed de novo); Lord v. Society for the
Preservation of New England Antiquities, Inc., 639 A.2d 623, 624 (Me. 1994) (same).
ME. R. Civ. P. 52(a) provides that factual findings will not be reversed unless they
are clearly erroneous. The Maine Law Court has said:
The essential impact of the "clearly erroneous" rule is that the trial judge's
findings stand unless they clearly cannot be correct because there is no
competent evidence to support them. An appellate court can reverse a
finding of fact only where (1) there is no competent evidence in the record
to support it, or (2) it is based on a clear misapprehension by the trial court
of the meaning of the evidence, or (3) the force and effect of the evidence,
taken as a total entity, rationally persuades to a certainty that the finding is
so against the great preponderance of the believable evidence that it does
not represent the truth and right of the case.
Harmon v. Emerson, 425 A.2d 978, 982 (Me. 1981). The Law Court explained long
ago, however, the reasons why factual matter should be reviewed deferentially. The
court has said:
When the testimony is conflicting, the judge has an opportunity to form an
opinion of the credibility of witnesses, not afforded to the full court. Often
there are things passing before the eye of a trial judge that are not capable
of being preserved in the record. A witness may appear badly upon the
stand and well in the record.
[Vol. 49:367
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one of "fact," a court generally will review it only for clear error. If
an issue is deemed one of "law," a court will exercise a de novo
review. This designation is critically important in cases when "facts"
and "law" are intertwined because how issues are labeled can deter-
mine the outcome of the appeal. Commentators, academics, and
students, however, have had considerable difficulty in drawing the
respective boundaries of the designations of "fact" and "law." As
one author noted, "At first blush, this distinction might seem self-
evident, yet commentators have disputed for decades the bounda-
ries of each, and noted their 'delusive simplicity.""' Fact has been
described as that which is "a question of the existence, reality, truth
of something; of the rei veritas.""1 Another author has defined a
finding of fact as "a determination by the court or the jury concern-
ing facts averred by one party and denied by another."'  Law, on
the other hand, is "'that which is not fact,' or 'that which involves
rules or principles."" 3 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has said
that "[a] finding of fact, to which the clearly erroneous rule applies,
is a finding based on the 'fact-finding tribunal's experience with the
mainsprings of human conduct'. [sic] A conclusion of law would be
a conclusion based on [the] application of a legal standard." '14
The premise of this Article is that metaphysical attempts to find
the true essence of "fact" and "law" are misguided and have been
perpetuated for far too long. What is at stake is not essence but
characterization. The labels "fact" and "law" are attached to issues
only after the policies underlying substantive law have influenced
the appellate court to apply one standard of review or another. In
this area of the law, Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, understands that the label is based on policy con-
siderations: "'Law' and 'fact' do not in legal discourse denote pre-
existing things; they express policy-grounded legal conclusions. We
ought to ask what is gained and what lost by appel late second-guess-
ing of a federal district judge's determination." Other commenta-
Young v. Witham, 75 Me. 536, 537 (1884). The court has also stated that "[the
'clearly erroneous' standard is not based merely on the trial court's ability to judge
the demeanor and credibility of live witnesses, but also on a recognition of the trial
court's particular expertise in fact finding and its proper institutional role." Casco
Northern Bank v. JBI Assocs., 667 A.2d 856, 859 (Me. 1995) (citing In re Estate of
Ibuly, 545 A.2d 1275, 1277-78 (Me. 1988)).
10. Hofer, supra note 3, at 235 (citing Nathan Isaacs, The Law and the Facts, 22
COLrNL L. REv. 1 (1922)); see also A. LEo LnvN Er AL, CASES ON CPvL. PRocE.
DuRE 798 (1992) ("Determining the precise meaning and applicability of each of
these terms is not without its difficulties.").
11. JAMES B. THAYER, A P iiNARY TREA-rsE ON EVIDNCE AT CO.,MON
LAW 191 (1898), quoted in Hofer, supra note 3, at 236 (footnotes omitted).
12. Brennan, supra note 3, at 380.
13. Hofer, supra note 3, at 236.
14. Lundgren v. Freeman, 307 F.2d 104, 115 (9th Cir. 1962).
15. Weidner v. Thieret, 866 F.2d 958, 961 (7th Cir. 1989).
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tors have observed this problem but have failed to provide a better
alternative. One commentator stated:
Our discussion of definitions has thus far taken us, it would
seem, little way from a purely intuitive understanding of fact
and law. Fact is empirical, it concerns itself with events occur-
ring either in the real world or in the mind, and it is the fodder
for the application of law. Law, on the other hand, consists of
rules, standards, or principles determined in advance of their
application. These definitions, it is submitted offer insuffi-
cient guidance in determining which is which.'
The United States Supreme Court has concluded that "we [do not]
yet know of any other rule or principle that will unerringly distin-
guish a factual finding from a legal conclusion."17 Judge Friendly
once said, "[What a court can determine better than a jury [is] per-
haps about the only satisfactory criterion for distinguishing 'law'
from 'fact.""' Other authors have recognized the difficulty in dis-
cerning "fact" from "law." Their conclusions demonstrate that we
should abandon the search for inherent characteristics of "fact" and
"law" when thinking about and applying standards of review. In-
deed, the failure to adequately define the inherent qualities of "fact"
and "law" demonstrates that this labeling is merely a cover for pol-
icy arguments. The words themselves, "fact" and "law," mean much
16. Hofer, supra note 3, at 237; see also Evan Tsen Lee, Principled Decision Mak-
ing and the Proper Role of Federal Appellate Courts: The Mixed Questions Conflict,
64 S. CAt. L. REv. 235, 236 (1991) ("After all, the labels 'law' and 'fact' often
amount to little more than divisions of decision-making authority between judges
and juries or between appellate courts and trial courts."); Cooper, supra note 3, at
645. "[Ihe 'clearly erroneous' phrase has no intrinsic meaning. It is elastic, capa-
cious, malleable, and above all variable. Because it means nothing, it can mean
anything and everything that it ought to mean." ld. Cooper further states that
"[tihe fundamental secret is out, and notoriously so. Characterization of an issue of
law application as fact or law for purposes of identifying a formalized standard of
review depends on the perceived need for review, not on the actual status of the
issue." Id. at 660. Still another commentator notes:
Some would insist that [difficulty in determining between fact and law] ex-
ists because the asserted distinction is fundamentally incoherent. The inco-
herence argument seems greatly overdrawn once it is recognized that any
distinction posited between "law" and "fact" does not imply the existence
of static, polar opposites. Rather, law and fact have a nodal quality; they
are points of rest and relative stability on a continuum of experience.
Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 229,233 (1985)
(footnotes omitted); see also James B. Thayer, "Law and Fact" in Jury Trials, 4
HARv. L. REV. 147 (1890).
17. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982). The United States
Supreme Court also has said that "the proper characterization of a question as one
of fact or law is sometimes slippery." Thompson v. Keohane, 116 S. Ct. 457, 464
(1995). In another case, the Court stated that it "has long noted the difficulty of
distinguishing between legal and factual issues." Cooter & Gell v. Hartmax Corp.,
496 U.S. 384, 401 (1990).
18. United States v. J.B. Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414, 431 (2d Cir. 1974).
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less than the rationales and arguments which give them their
meaning.
As the case law and these authorities demonstrate, standards of
review are not "discoverable" as a matter of the inherent, physical
properties and propensities of "facts" and "law." They are "charac-
terizations." Thus, the practitioner must examine and explore a
deeper, more difficult, but also more interesting terrain. To navigate
this terrain successfully, an advocate ideally should determine the
standard of review before deciding to attempt an appeal. An appel-
late court also should utilize the standard of review to define its role
in each case. When area for argumentation exists, both the court
and the lawyers should understand, examine, and argue the compet-
ing policies for choosing one level of deference over another. The
party seeking appellate review of an issue will want as little defer-
ence to the trial court's decision as possible. Therefore, the party
will try to label the issue as one of "law."' 9 The party who was suc-
cessful in the trial court will try to have the appellate court give as
much deference to the trial court's decision as possible by labeling
the issue as one of "fact." When presented with such an issue, how
should the appellate court decide which label to use? How can the
parties effectively argue their choice of label? This Article suggests
that policy reasons underlie the standard of review and choice of
label and that the more effective advocate is the one who advances
better and sounder policy reasons for a particular standard of review
instead of arguing the metaphysics of the issues. Why we label, and
not the labeling itself, demands our attention and energy.
Only at the margins is the labeling easy. Pure historical facts,
such as what time of day the incident occurred, are easily labeled
"fact." Pure legal issues, such as the definition of "proximate cause"
in jury instructions, are easily labeled "law." There is, however, a
vast middle ground of "mixed" questions of application of historical
fact to legal standards. To survey the terrain of this middle ground,
resort to the case law is essential.
The second part of this Article will explore some United States
Supreme Court cases that discuss the standards of review and the
policy reasons for assigning a certain level of deference to each of
the issues presented. The goal in the second part of the Article will
be to expose and examine the arguments for and against each possi-
ble standard of review. The United States Supreme Court has ex-
plicitly considered the application of different standards of review,
and the serious advocate can discern several useful methods of argu-
19. See Brennan, supra note 3, at 408. Brennan notes that "one certainty is that
counsel will use every argumentative tool available to classify an appealable issue as
being a conclusion of law. While facts are not considered on appeal, review of a
conclusion of law means a second hearing for at least part of an appellant's cause."
Id.
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mentation from these cases. Part HI of this Article will analyze
some Maine Law Court cases in which the standard of review was
central to the decision of federal questions. A comparison between
Law Court and United States Supreme Court cases will demonstrate
that standard of review issues are debatable questions and certainly
not ones for which consistent answers have always been given. Part
IV will analyze three Law Court decisions on state law questions.
These cases demonstrate that although policy rationales are not al-
ways articulated with clarity, they are implicitly present in the label-
ing of issues as those of "fact" or "law." Finally, Part V will offer
some concluding observations on standards of review.20
II. UNrrED STATES SUPREME COURT CASE LAW
The United States Supreme Court has explicitly considered the
application of different standards of review for various issues.
Often, the sole question on certiorari centers on choosing the stan-
dard of review. These cases demonstrate that argumentation of pol-
icy rationales lies behind the Court's decision to apply a certain level
of deference in a particular case. Moreover, they expose areas and
theories of argumentation for the advocate to utilize in future cases.
An instructive case to begin with is Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union of United States, Inc.21 The basis for this case arose when the
defendant, Consumers Union, published an article in Consumer Re-
ports on brands of loudspeakers, including the plaintiff's, Bose.'
Bose objected to a statement in a report that was critical of one of
its models. The review stated in part:
Worse, individual instruments heard through the Bose system
seemed to grow to gigantic proportions and tended to wander
about the room. For instance, a violin appeared to be 10 feet
wide and a piano stretched from wall to wall. With orchestral
music, such effects seemed inconsequential. But we think they
might become annoying when listening to soloists. 3
Bose filed suit in federal district court contending that the defend-
ant had disparaged its product.' The court conducted a nineteen-
day bench trial, and the author of the article testified for six days
about the speakers and his statement.' The United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts held that Bose had met the
20. This Article does not contain a laundry list of standards of review for particu-
lar issues, although such a list is theoretically possible. The creation of such a list,
however, is inconsistent with the very premise of the Article, that standards of re-
view are not indelible. Rather, they are indeed debatable and malleable subjects.
21. 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
22. See id. at 487-88.
23. Id. at 488.
24. See id.
25. See id. at 489, 495.
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"actual malice" standard promulgated in New York Tunes v. Sulli-
van: the statement about the speakers was a false statement of fact,
and Bose had satisfied its burden of showing that Consumer Reports
had made the false statement with the knowledge that it was false or
with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity. .
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed
that determination.27 This court decided that the district court's de-
termination of "actual malice" should be reviewed de novo instead
of under the clearly erroneous standard of Rule 52 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover, in reversing the plaintiff's
judgment, the court held that although the defendants may have
used imprecise language, such language "[did] not support an infer-
ence of actual malice."2 9 On appeal to the United States Supreme
Court, the sole question before the Court was whether the appellate
court should have applied the clearly erroneous standard of Rule
26. See id. at 490-91; see also New York Tunes Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964).
27. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. at 492.
28. By way of example, Rule 52(a) of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure states:
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an
advisory jury, the Superior Court justice or, if an electronic recording was
made in the District Court, the District Court judge, shall, upon the request
of a party made as a motion within 5 days after notice of the decision, or
may upon its own motion, find the facts specially and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon and direct the entry of the appropriate judg-
ment if it differs from any judgment that may have been entered before
such request was made; provided that, in every action for termination of
parental rights, the court shall make findings of fact and state its conclu-
sions of law thereon whether or not requested by a party. In granting or
refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly on such request
set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes
of review. Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous,
and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge
of the credibility of the witnesses. The findings of a referee, to the extent
that the court adopts them, shah be considered as the findings of the court.
If an opinion or memorandum of decision is filed, it will be sufficient if the
findings of fact and conclusions of law appear therein. Findings of fact and
conclusions of law are unnecessary on decisions of motions under Rules 12
or 56 or any other motion except as provided in Rule 50(d).
M. R Crv. P. 52(a); see also FED. t Civ. P. 52(a). Wright notes that "[p]robably
no provision of the federal rules has been quoted and cited more often than the
famous sentence in Rule 52(a) . . . ." CHARL~s ALAN WRIGHr, Tim LAw OF FRO.
ERAI Coutns § 96, at 689 (5th ed. 1994); see also 1 RICHARD M. Fmmn -r AL,
MAuNECrvm PRAcncn § 52.7 (2d ed. 1970) (discussing the application of the
"clearly erroneous" test); Edward H. Cooper, Civil Rule 52(a): Rationing and Ratio-
nalizing the Resources of Appellate Review, 63 NomE DA.m L Rnv. 645, 647 n.8
(1988) (listing articles discussing the history of Rule 52).
29. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 692 F.2d 189,197 (1st
Cir. 1982).
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5230 to the determination of "actual malice," or whether the appel-
late court should have reviewed the determination de novo as a
question of law.
On appeal, Bose argued that the appellate court had erred in ap-
plying a de novo standard to the issue of "actual malice."'' a Because
a determination of "actual malice" depended on the credibility of
the witnesses, a deferential standard of review should apply and
thus, the trial judge's conclusion should be reinstated.32 Consumers
30. Much has been written about the meaning of Rule 52, and the vessel of "clear
erroneousness" conveys little until meaning fills it. One treatise states that "clear
error" means that the "court's findings are presumptively correct." CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE AND PRoCEDUR § 2585, at
565 (2d ed. 1995). One court has stated that the findings "come here well armed
with the buckler and shield" of the rule. Machinery Rental, Inc. v. Herpel (In re
Matter of Multiponics, Inc.), 622 F.2d 709, 723 (5th Cir. 1980); see also Horton v.
U.S. Steel Corp., 286 F.2d 710, 713 (5th Cir. 1961). Another court, however, has
issued a more comical interpretation. Parts & Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec.,
Inc., 866 F.2d 228, 233 (7th Cir. 1988) ("[T]he decision must strike us as more than
just maybe or probably wrong; it must ... strike us as wrong with the force of a five-
week-old, unrefrigerated dead fish."). The United States Supreme Court's defini-
tion is that "[a] finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to
support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). The Court has concluded that "certain gen-
eral principles governing the exercise of the appellate court's power to overturn
findings of a district court may be derived from our cases." Anderson v. City of
Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985). "If the district court's account of the evi-
dence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals
may not reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact,
it would have weighed the evidence differently." Id. at 573-74. The United States
Supreme Court has stated several times that the function of the court is not to re-
view the evidence anew. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,
395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969). "This standard plainly does not entitle a reviewing court to
reverse the finding of the trier of fact simply because it is convinced that it would
have decided the case differently." Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. at
573. The factfinder's choice between two permissible views of the evidence also
cannot be clearly erroneous. Id. at 574. In another case, however, Judge Learned
Hand stated:
It is idle to try to define the meaning of the phrase "clearly erroneous"; all
that can be profitably said is that an appellate court, though it will hesitate
less to reverse the finding of a judge than that of an administrative tribunal
or of a jury, will nevertheless reverse it most reluctantly and only when well
persuaded.
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 433 (2d Cir. 1945).
31. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. at 493.
32. In addition to the various United States Supreme Court pronouncements
granting deference to the factflnder, commentators also have noted that the trial
court's ability to determine the credibility of a witness is a compelling reason to
grant the lower court a large measure of deference. See Brennan, supra note 3, at
397. The United States Supreme Court has said that "[t]he rationale for deference
to the original finder of fact is not limited to the superiority of the trial judge's
position to make determinations of credibility. The trial judge's major role is the
determination of fact, and with experience in fulfilling that role comes expertise."
[Vol. 49:367
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Union, on the other hand, reminded the Court that when First
Amendment issues arise in a case, the Court has said that the appel-
late court has an obligation to "'make an independent examination
of the whole record' in order to make sure that 'the judgment does
not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expres-
sion."' 33 Thus, the policies that allow the trial judge to assess the
demeanor of witnesses directly conflicted with the appellate court's
power to police the right of people to speak freely.
The issue of "actual malice" is "inherently" neither an issue of
"fact" nor "law." How it should be characterized involves a policy
choice rooted in the substantive law. The United States Supreme
Court concluded that the nature of an "actual malice" determina-
tion demanded that a de novo standard be applied. 4 The Court
found itself stuck between the principle embodied in Rule 52 and
the contrary principle established in the First Amendment area, and
yet concluded that "[t]he conflict between the two rules is in some
respects more apparent than real."3 The Court analogized the de-
termination of "actual malice" to other mixed legal determinations
of exceptions to speech protected by the First Amendment.' The
Court found that the circumstances underlying the creation and
evolution of the New York Times rule demanded that judges, includ-
ing those on the Supreme Court, "make sure that it is correctly ap-
plied."37 Applying the de novo standard, the Court concluded that
the choice of language, "though reflecting a misconception, does not
place the speech beyond the outer limits of the First Amendment's
broad protective umbrella."
Bose Corp. is an example of a judicial choice between policy con-
siderations. The United States Supreme Court did not bury its anal-
ysis of the applicable standard of review in a confusing
pronouncement that an issue of "fact" or "law" was involved. In-
stead, it acknowledged that such decisions depend, at their base, on
a weighing of policy rationales. First, the majority opinion recog-
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. at 574. Maine law is clear that matters
regarding the credibility of witnesses are left to the factfinder. See, eg., State v.
Doughty, 399 A.2d 1319, 1326 (Me. 1979) ("[lit is the exclusive province of the
factfinder, here the jury, to decide what credence should be given to the various
witnesses and their testimony.").
33. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, 466 U.S. at 499 (quoting
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964)). Commentators have
given support to the idea that appellate courts should freely review conclusions of
law. "[I]t is safe to say that an appellate court is not only entitled to review freely a
lower court's conclusions of law, but has the duty to do so." Brennan, supra note 3,
at 406-07.
34. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. at 511.
35. Id. at 499.
36. See id. at 504-05.
37. Id. at 502.
38. Id. at 513.
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nized that differences in deference depend on the particular area of
substantive law at issue. The Court stated that "[t]he requirement
that special deference be given to a trial judge's credibility determi-
nations is itself a recognition of the broader proposition that the
presumption of correctness that attaches to factual findings is
stronger in some cases than in others."39 The Court, however, made
clear that no deference applied when a de novo review was applied
to an issue labeled as one of "law."
Rule 52(a) applies to findings of fact, including those de-
scribed as "ultimate facts" because they may determine the
outcome of litigation. But Rule 52(a) does not inhibit an ap-
pellate court's power to correct errors of law, including those
that may infect a so-called mixed finding of law and fact, or a
finding of fact that is predicated on a misunderstanding of the
governing rule of law.40
Additionally, the Court properly questioned what should be labeled
as a "fact":
A finding of fact in some cases is inseparable from the princi-
ples through which it was deduced. At some point, the rea-
soning by which a fact is "found" crosses the line between
application of those ordinary principles of logic and common
experience which are ordinarily entrusted to the finder of fact
into the realm of a legal rule upon which the reviewing court
must exercise its own independent judgment. Where the line
is drawn varies according to the nature of the substantive law
at issue. Regarding certain largely factual questions in some
areas of the law, the stakes-in terms of impact on future
cases and future conduct-are too great to entrust them finally
to the judgment of the trier of fact.4'
Thus, the Court found that in weighing the policy reasons in favor of
Rule 52's application against First Amendment values in this case,
the constitutional values weighed more heavily.
Justice Rehnquist dissented. He found it ironic that the majority
rejected the clearly erroneous rule for the "constitutional facts" at
issue in determining the existence of "actual malice."'42 In his view,
"actual malice" depended on "the mens rea of the author," and de-
termining mens rea involved making "findings which appellate
courts are simply ill-prepared to make in any context, including the
First Amendment context." 43 He disagreed with the labeling in
which the Court had engaged: "In my view the problem results
from the Court's attempt to treat what is here, and in other contexts
always has been, a pure question of fact, as something more than a
39. Id. at 500.
40. Id. at 501 (citations omitted).
41. Id. at 501 n.17.
42. Id. at 515 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
43. Id.
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fact-a so-called 'constitutional fact."'" Justice Rehnquist found it
anomalous that:
we have always felt perfectly at ease leaving state-of-mind de-
terminations, such as the actual knowledge and recklessness
determinations involved here, to triers of fact with only defer-
ential appellate review-for example, in criminal cases where
the burden of proving those facts is even greater than the
"clear and convincing" standard applicable under New York
T7nes45
In Justice Rehnquist's view, the crux of the case was that a trial
court had made a credibility determination. He concluded that he
was "at a loss to see how appellate courts can even begin to make
such determinations."'  Justice Rehnquist found greater reliability
in the findings the trial judges reached. Finally, Justice Relnquist
found that the de novo review would be completely inefficient be-
cause "the primary result of the Court's holding today will not be
greater protection for First Amendment values, but rather only less-
ened confidence in the judgments of lower courts and more entirely
factbound appeals."47 Based on policy concerns argued by Bose
Corporation, Justice Rehnquist would have chosen the label "fact"
over "law."
A year later, the United States Supreme Court built on its stan-
dard of review jurisprudence. In Miller v. Fenton,' the defendant
was under investigation for the killing of a seventeen-year-old girl.
After the defendant signed a Miranda waiver form, a detective em-
barked on an hour-long interrogation session that included false re-
ports to the defendant that the victim had just died, that the
defendant had already been identified, and that blood stains had
been found at the defendant's residence.4 9 After more coaxing,
Miller confessed to the crime.50 The trial court denied the defend-
ant's motion to suppress the evidence gained from the interrogation,
and a jury subsequently found him guilty of murder.5 1 The New
Jersey Superior Court reversed the judgment because it concluded
that the confession had been compelled in violation of due pro-
cess.52 The New Jersey Supreme Court, however, disagreed with the
appeals court and determined that the confession was "voluntary"
and was properly admitted in evidence.53 The defendant then filed
44. Id. at 517.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 519.
47. Id. at 520.
48. 474 U.S. 104 (1985).
49. See id. at 106.
50. See id. at 107.
51. See id. at 108.
52. See id.
53. See id.
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a habeas corpus petition in federal district court. The district court
dismissed the case without a hearing, and the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit affirmed." In its view, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which
allows for a "factual" issue's presumed correctness,5 5 applied to the
determination of whether the confession was "voluntary." The
Court granted certiorari on the question of whether the presump-
tion of correctness of a "factual" determination applied to a state
supreme court finding of "voluntariness." Obviously, "voluntari-
ness" "is" a "mixed question" of application of historical facts to the
due process standard. Thus, arguments derived from policy could
determine whether "voluntariness" is a "factual" or "legal" issue.
The United States Supreme Court found that the federal courts
should make an independent determination of whether the defend-
ant's statements were "voluntary." The Court concluded that the
case law before the passage of section 2254 demonstrated that the
ultimate issue of voluntariness required an independent federal de-
termination.56 In its ruling, the Court expressed its understanding of
the difficulty of determining when to label an issue "fact" or "law":
Perhaps much of the difficulty in this area stems from the
practical truth that the decision to label an issue a "question of
law," a "question of fact," or a "mixed question of law and
fact" is sometimes as much a matter of allocation as it is of
analysis. At least in those instances in which Congress has not
spoken and in which the issue falls somewhere between a pris-
tine legal standard and a simple historical fact, the fact/law dis-
tinction at times has turned on a determination that, as a
matter of the sound administration of justice, one judicial ac-
tor is better positioned than another to decide the issue in
question.57
In Miller, the Court decided that the better positioned judicial ac-
tor to conclude whether the confession was "voluntary" was the ap-
pellate court. One winning strategy for Miller was that the United
States Supreme Court had said repeatedly before the enactment of
the federal law that "voluntariness" was independently reviewed by
the appellate court.58 Miller could argue that because of the impor-
54. See id. at 108-09.
55. See id. at 108. Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1995) provides:
In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a writ
of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a
State court, a determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue,
made by a State court of competent jurisdiction... shall be presumed to be
correct ....
56. See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. at 110-12.
57. Id. at 113-14 (citation omitted).
58. See id. at 110. ("Without exception, the Court's confession cases hold that the
ultimate issue of 'voluntariness' is a legal question requiring independent federal
determination.") (citations omitted).
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tance of protecting due process rights, not unlike the First Amend-
ment context of Bose Corp., the appellate court should take a fresh
look at the confession. Indeed, the Court said:
[I]t is telling that in confession cases coming from the States,
this Court has consistently looked to the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to test admissibility. The locus
of the right is significant because it reflects the Court's consist-
ently held view that the admissibility of a confession turns as
much on whether the techniques for extracting the statements,
as applied to this suspect, are compatible with a system that
presumes innocence and assures that a conviction will not be
secured by inquisitorial means as on whether the defendant's
will was in fact overborne 5 9
Moreover, the Court dismissed the principal contention that Bose
had raised before-that credibility determinations were for the trial
court. The Court concluded that the trial court was in a better posi-
tion to deal with underlying factual questions such as the length and
circumstances of the interrogation, Miranda warnings, and the like.
The Court noted, however, that
once such underlying factual issues have been resolved, and
the moment comes for determining whether, under the totality
of the circumstances, the confession was obtained in a manner
consistent with the Constitution, the state-court judge is not in
an appreciably better position than the federal habeas court to
make that determination.60
Just last term, the United States Supreme Court again found occa-
sion to discuss the merits of different levels of deference. In Ornelas
v. United States,61 the Court considered what standard of review
should be used for determinations of probable cause to search, and
articulable suspicion to stop a vehicle. Two persons consented to a
search of their Oldsmobile in Milwaukee. One of the officers
searched the interior and noticed that a panel above the passenger
armrest was loose.6 - The officer testified that a screw in the door
jam next to the panel was rusty, which indicated to him that the
screw had been previously removed. Upon taking apart the panel,
the officer found two kilograms of cocaine. 63 After an evidentiary
hearing, a magistrate found as a matter of fact that there was no rust
on the screw, and therefore, the officer did not have a sufficient ba-
sis to believe that the panel contained illegal drugs.64 The magis-
59. Id. at 116 (citations omitted).
60. Id. at 117.
61. 116 S. Ct. 1657 (1996).
62. See id. at 1660.
63. See id.
64. See a
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trate, however, concluded that the officer would have found the
drugs anyway with a drug-sniffing dog named Merlin.65
The district court, adopting a portion of the magistrate's recom-
mendation, concluded that the officers had a reasonable articulable
suspicion to believe that criminal activity had occurred based on the
model, age, and source-state of the car, the fact that the defendants
had checked into a motel without reservations, and the fact that a
computer database listed both individuals as drug dealers; the court
found that the suspicion ripened into probable cause when the of-
ficer found the loose panel.66
On appeal, the government argued that the officers' conclusion
that they had a reasonable articulable suspicion and their determi-
nation of probable cause after finding the loose panel should be re-
viewed deferentially.67 The defendants, attempting to have the
court of appeals take a fresh look at the evidence, presumably ar-
gued for a de novo review of the determinations of articulable suspi-
cion and probable cause. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit agreed with the government's position by reviewing the dis-
trict judge's determinations deferentially and upholding the deter-
mination of probable cause as not clearly erroneous.68 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit court
dispute over the standard of review.69
The United States Supreme Court noted that precise articulations
of "probable cause" and "articulable suspicion" are impossible. 0
The Court found that the two major components of these findings
were the historical facts leading to the stop and a decision about
whether they amounted to a reasonable suspicion or probable
cause. 71 The second component of the analysis, the Court found,
was a mixed question of fact and law. Faced with a choice of apply-
ing either a clear error or de novo standard of review, the Court
chose the latter. 2 First, the Court noted that varied results by lower
courts would "be inconsistent with the idea of a unitary system of
law."'73 Citing Miller, the Court concluded that "the legal rules for
probable cause and reasonable suspicion acquire content only
through application. Independent review is therefore necessary if
appellate courts are to maintain control of, and to clarify, the legal
principles. ' 74 Finally, the Court decided that a de novo review
65. See id. at 1659-60.
66. See id. at 1660.
67. See id.
68. See id at 1660-61.
69. See iL at 1661.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 1661-62.
72. See id. at 1662.
73. Id.
74. Id. (citing Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)).
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would serve to provide officers with a better defined set of rules so
that they might make a correct determination beforehand about the
validity of the search or stop.75 The Court held:
As a general matter determinations of reasonable suspicion
and probable cause should be reviewed de novo on appeal.
Having said this, we hasten to point out that a reviewing court
should take care both to review findings of historical fact only
for clear error and to give due weight to inferences drawn
from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement
officers. 76
Omelas clarifies that a finding of articulable suspicion or probable
cause is one that is to be reviewed de novo as a "mixed" question,
and the position garnering the majority endeavored to explain why
that standard of review makes the process in the Fourth Amend-
ment area work "better" than before. Labeling the question as one
of "law," the United States Supreme Court retained authority to de-
fine the parameters of the legal concepts of "probable cause" and
"articulable suspicion." With that authority comes an ability to pro-
vide both clarity and uniformity in the Fourth Amendment area.
Striving to achieve both efficiency and fairness concerns, the Court
chose not to leave these determinations to the individual, and per-
haps inconsistent, decisions of federal trial judges.
Justice Scalia dissented and first noted that when a mixed ques-
tion of fact and law exists, the Court applies a de novo or deferential
standard "depending upon essentially practical considerations."'
Justice Scalia concluded that the lower court, with its expertise and
better familiarity with the issues and parties, would be better able to
make the determination of probable cause or reasonable suspi-
cion.7" He found the "law-clarifying value" of a de novo review
negligible because Fourth Amendment decisions are often fact-
bound and do not serve as useful precedents.79 Finally, Justice
Scalia found contradiction in the Court's holding:
In an apparent effort to reduce the unproductive burden to-
day's decision imposes on appellate courts, or perhaps to sal-
vage some of the trial court's superior familiarity with the facts
that it has cast aside, the Court suggests that an appellate
court should give "due weight" to a trial court's finding that an
officer's inference of wrongdoing . . . was reasonable. The
Court cannot have it both ways. This finding of "reasonable-
ness" is precisely what it has told us the appellate court must
75. See id.
76. Id. at 1663.
77. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
78. See id. at 1664.
79. See id. at 1665.
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review de novo; and in de novo review, the "weight due" to a
trial court's finding is zero.80
In the majority's opinion, however, Justice Scalia was wrong. Effi-
ciency concerns would be satisfied even if not every case turned on
exactly identical facts.8 ' Moreover, the inferences that the Court
referred to in its holding could only be historical ones rather than
legal ones. If that distinction is not drawn, the majority opinion
makes no logical sense. When that distinction is drawn, however,
the rationale is more sound; historical facts and inferences are given
due weight, but determinations of probable cause or articulable sus-
picion, now labeled as "legal" issues, are to be reviewed without any
deference whatsoever.
What is going on in these cases? The debate certainly is not
whether, looking at the issue with either intuitive or analytical eyes,
an issue is one of "fact" or "law." Instead, these three United States
Supreme Court authorities provide compelling, if not conclusive, ev-
idence that the decision to label something as "fact" or "law" is
based essentially on policy considerations. Whether something was
inherently "factual" or "legal" played no role in these decisions.
Because policy rationales were involved, advocacy clearly had a role
to play in these cases. Bringing forth arguments in favor of certain
standards of review, each side was given the opportunity to advocate
why a certain level of deference would make the legal system work
in a "better" way. The answers to the policy debates are reflected in
the majority opinions and their choice of how to label certain issues.
These cases are not exhaustive. Countless other cases for analysis
may be found at any appellate level of state or federal courts. All
courts label issues so that they may apply standards of review,
whether explicitly or not. Moreover, the frequency with which judi-
cial discussions include a substantive discussion of standards of re-
view is directly correlated with the frequency with which the issue is
briefed and argued by lawyers.
III. THE MAINE LAW COURT AND FEDERAL QUESTIONS
The Maine Law Court has been much less explicit about the pol-
icy reasons for labeling choices than the United States Supreme
Court. The silence, however, certainly does not indicate that the
policy decisions have not been made; they have been, but the policy
choices must be drawn out of the cases. For instance, in the areas of
the voluntariness of confessions and determinations of probable
cause or articulable suspicion, the standards of review used by the
United States Supreme Court and the Law Court directly conflict.
This dichotomy, however, means only that the standard of review in
80. Id. at 1666 (citation omitted).
81. See id. at 1662-63.
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some particular areas of law is debatable and, therefore, open to
future legal argument.'
TWo Law Court cases are instructive in the area of searches and
seizures. In State v. Dean,8 an officer spotted Dean's car while pa-
trolling a dead-end road in a residential neighborhood at 11:00 pan.
The officer patrolled the area at the request of neighborhood prop-
erty owners who had complained of acts of vandalism. Dean's driv-
ing was "unremarkable" and the only reason the officer stopped
Dean was due to his presence at that "particular time and place."S
The district court denied Dean's motion to suppress evidence as a
result of the stop, concluding that the officer did not act in an arbi-
trary fashion. After the superior court vacated the decision, the
State appealed to the Law Court. The State, seeking to secure a
deferential review of the district court's conclusion, argued that the
matter should be reviewed for clear error.85 Dean did not argue
that a de novo review was appropriate," but clearly he should have.
By doing so, he could have marshaled policy considerations like
those advanced in Ornelas.
The Law Court held that the district court's "findings that the of-
ficer's suspicion was reasonable and the stop was justified [were] not
clearly erroneous."'  The Law Court's analysis began by noting that
"[w]hether an officer had the necessary reasonable suspicion to war-
rant an investigatory stop is a question of fact, reviewed only for
clear error."'' s In finding that the district court did not commit clear
error, the Law Court stated that Dean "was driving through an
uninhabited development site on a dead end street at 11:00 at
night."' 9 Finally, the Law Court also indicated that in finding no
clear error, it was "[b]alancing the facts on which [the officer] relied
to make the stop against Dean's right to be free from any arbitrary
intrusions by the State .... 90
Justice Glassman was the sole dissenter. Her dissent, however,
was not based on the choice of the standard of review. Instead, she
concluded that the officer's suspicion was a mere hunch and that
"[t]he constitutional right to be free from an illegal stop should not
82. This Article does not address what is, in my view, a large issue: whether
standards of review are part of the substantive federal law binding on the states. For
instance, if the United States Supreme Court decides that Fifth Amendment issues
should be reviewed de novo on appeal, must the Law Court follow this directive?
83. 645 A2d 634 (Me. 1995).
84. See id. at 634-35.
85. Brief for Appellant at 3, State v. Dean, 645 A.2d 634 (Me. 1995) (No. OXF-
93-744).
86. Brief for Appellee, State v. Dean, 645 A.2d 634 (Me. 1995) (No. OXF-93-
744).
87. State v. Dean, 645 A.2d at 637.
88. Id. at 635 (citing State v. Worster, 611 A.2d 979, 980 (Me. 1992)).
89. Id. at 636.
90. Id. at 637.
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be abridged solely on the basis of the day of the week or time of day
a car is being operated on a public way. Such arbitrariness is incon-
sistent with the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment." 91
Thus, Justice Glassman believed that clear error existed in this case,
and presumably would have decided the issue the same way had the
determination been reviewed de novo. How many other justices
would have joined the dissent's conclusion if the determination of
articulable suspicion had not been reviewed under the extremely
deferential standard of clear error? Would the Law Court have
been persuaded if Dean had argued for a different standard of re-
view? Would the denial of the motion to suppress still have been
upheld? Because the issue was never raised, the Law Court's opin-
ion did not address it.
The Law Court, however, does not apply a deferential standard of
review in all investigatory stop cases. In State v. Brown,92 an officer
observed Brown making a turn in his vehicle. As he did so, both
tires on the left side crossed over the yellow center line, then jerked
to the right and struck the right fog line with the right front tire.
Brown then steered back into the middle of the lane. In addition,
the speed of the vehicle varied during this time. The district court
granted Brown's motion to suppress the evidence, and the State ap-
pealed. The State, seeking now to avoid deferential review, labeled
the issue as one of "law" that should be reviewed independently by
the Law Court.93 Brown sought deferential review of the determi-
nation of articulable suspicion.94
Although the Law Court recognized that it reviews for clear error
a trial court's finding of whether a stop was justified by an objec-
tively reasonable and articulable suspicion, the court concluded,
without further discussion, that "[a] ruling on a motion to suppress
based on undisputed facts, however, involves a legal conclusion that
we independently review."95 In effect, the Law Court said that
although it labeled the issue as "factual" in cases such as Dean, the
affixed label in this case would be one of "law." The Law Court
then relied on the early morning hour, crossing the center line, strik-
91. Id. at 637-38 (Glassman, J., dissenting).
92. 675 A.2d 504 (Me. 1996).
93. Brief of Appellant at 7, State v. Brown, 675 A.2d 504 (Me. 1996) (KEN-95-
531).
94. Brief for Appellee at 4-5, State v. Brown, 675 A.2d 504 (Me. 1996) (KEN-95-
531).
95. State v. Brown, 675 A.2d at 505 (citing State v. Dube, 655 A.2d 338, 340 (Me.
1994)). These standards did not originate in these cases; they have been part of
Maine law for some time. See, eg., State v. Nelson, 638 A.2d 720, 722 (Me. 1994)
(clear error); State v. Dulac, 600 A.2d 1121, 1122 (Me. 1992) (same); State v. Cyr,
501 A.2d 1303, 1305 (Me. 1985) (same); State v. Thurlow, 485 A.2d 960, 963 (Me.
1984) (same); State v. Fillion, 474 A.2d 187, 190 (Me. 1984) (same). But see State v.
Dube, 655 A.2d 338, 340 (Me. 1995) (de novo); State v. Hill, 606 A.2d 793, 795 (Me.
1992) (same); State v. Cloutier, 544 A.2d 1277, 1280 (Me. 1988) (same).
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ing the fog line, and the speed of the vehicle to support a de novo
determination that articulable suspicion existed. No one dissented.
Would the district court's ruling have been overturned if the matter
had been reviewed deferentially instead of de novo? Could the re-
sults of this case be reconciled with the result of Dean if both had
been reviewed under the same level of deference?
This bifurcated standard of review for determinations of articul-
able suspicion and probable cause is inconsistent with the United
States Supreme Court's holding in Ornelas,96 yet it surely is not a
meaningless distinction made by the Law Court. For whatever rea-
son, the Law Court is more comfortable in conducting a de novo
review when the historical facts are undisputed than when they are
not. Under the doctrine set out by the United States Supreme
Court, however, the purely historical facts would always be re-
viewed deferentially, but the mixed questions of articulable suspi-
cion and probable cause would always be reviewed de novo. The
different standards of review generate the question of which stan-
dard is "better." Which standard is more soundly supported by pol-
icy rationales? The question is left for future advocates to study,
examine, and argue before both courts.
Another useful area of study is the voluntariness of confessions.
In State v. Graves,97 Graves, a police officer, was accused of sexually
assaulting a twenty-two-year-old woman. 93 On the day that the vic-
tim complained to the authorities, Graves's supervisor phoned him
and told him to come to the police station immediately.99 Upon his
arrival at the station, he was interviewed by two detectives. When
Graves saw the detectives, he said, "What did I do now?"' During
the interview, he first denied that the alleged victim had been at his
house on the night in question, then admitted that she was present
but denied any sexual contact, then finally admitted that sexual con-
tact occurred but suggested that the victim consented. 10 1 Graves
96. While the Law Court has not adopted the reasoning in Omelas, other state
courts generally have cited Ornelas approvingly. See State v. Rogers, 924 P.2d 1027,
1029 (Ariz. 1996); People v. Smith, 926 P.2d 186, 188 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996); State v.
Rodriguez, 684 A.2d 1165, 1171 n.17 (Conn. 1996); State v. Gonzalez, 6S2 So. 2d
1168,1170 n.2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); People v. Patterson, 667 N.E.2d 1360,1366
(. App. Ct. 1996); D.D. v. State, 668 N.E.2d 1250,1254 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); Jones
v. State, 681 A.2d 1190, 1195 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996); Commonwealth v. Alva-
rado, 667 N.E.2d 856,859 (Mass. 1996); City of Grand Forks v. Zejdlik, 551 N.W.2d
772, 774 (N.D. 1996); State v. Rodriquez, 476 S.E.2d 161, 164 (S.C. CL App. 1996);
Salt Lake City v. Smoot, 921 P.2d 1003, 1006 (Utah CL App. 1996); James v. Com-
monwealth, 473 S.E.2d 90, 91 (Va. CL App. 1996).
97. 638 A.2d 734 (Me. 1994).
98. See id. at 735.
99. See id.
100. Id. at 736.
101. See id. (quoting defendant's version of victim's response to his overture,
"I'm not going to say no... [but] I'm just going to lay here.").
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also admitted that he had been "evasive" with some of his re-
sponses.'02 Graves was not given Miranda warnings, and he testi-
fied that he did not feel that he had the choice to leave the interview
or to decline to answer questions. No one, however, told him that
he could not leave or that his job was in jeopardy if he did not an-
swer.10 3 The trial court refused to suppress statements made by
Graves before his arrest, and he subsequently appealed his
conviction. 1°4
Graves could have argued on appeal, citing Miller, that whether
his confession was voluntary should be reviewed de novo by the
Law Court. The State, seeking deferential review, could have cited
from a long line of Maine cases noting that whether a trial court
erred in finding that a confession was voluntary is reviewed only for
clear error.' 5 Graves apparently made no such argument, however,
and the court applied the clear error review.1°6 The court first noted
that the State has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the confession is voluntary.1 7 The Law Court subsequently
canvassed the trial court's findings and held that it had not commit-
ted clear error in finding that Graves's statement was voluntary.108
The standards of review used by the United States Supreme Court
and the Law Court conflict in that they label the issue of voluntari-
ness differently. Although the result on these facts probably would
not have been different had a de novo review been applied, this is-
sue certainly is open to discussion. The circumstances in this case
did not appear to be coercive. In any event, under more egregious
facts than these, a trial court's holding might not be clearly errone-
ous, but the appellate court, on a de novo review, might decide the
question differently. What if the detectives had told the defendant
that he was going to lose his job, his family would starve, and he
would be the object of ridicule in the department? What if they had
told him that he would receive no food until he confessed, even if it
took a couple of days? What if the detectives had threatened him
with physical harm? What if in fact they beat him into confessing?
Would it be "better" to label the voluntariness of a confession as an
issue of "fact" or "law"?"° In Miller, the United States Supreme
Court held that, in the habeas corpus setting, the issue should be
102. See id.
103. See id. at 737 & n.3.
104. See id. at 735-36.
105. See eg., State v. Smith, 615 A.2d 1162, 1163 (Me. 1992); State v. Hutchin-
son, 597 A.2d 1344, 1346 (Me. 1991); State v. Birmingham, 527 A.2d 759, 761 (Me.
1987); State v. Pinkham, 510 A.2d 520, 522 (Me. 1986).
106. State v. Graves, 638 A.2d at 737.
107. See i. at 736.
108. See id. at 737.
109. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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labeled as one of "law."110 Surprisingly, the Law Court has never
cited Miller in its decisions. If in some future case where a fair
amount of police coercion has occurred and a defendant has reluc-
tantly confessed, how should the trial court's conclusion that the
confession is voluntary be reviewed? Which standard of review is
the "better" one to utilize? The answer is left to the future argu-
ments of Maine defense lawyers if they choose to raise it in their
briefs.
Dean, Brown, and Graves all contained standards of review that
were applied after the Law Court labeled the issue that was being
reviewed. Furthermore, these cases demonstrate that although the
Law Court typically does not analyze in depth the appropriate stan-
dard of review, its rationale for applying particular standards of re-
view may be inferred from the labeling used by the court. Although
not as clearly, the Law Court also labels issues "fact" or "law" ac-
cording to the substantive law at issue. The same kind of policy ra-
tionales that applied in Ornelas and Miller apply in these cases, but
they remain largely unarticulated by the Law Court.
More important, the divergence of opinion in these two areas
demonstrates that standards of review are debatable topics, not use-
less appendages to the brief, scribbled in as an afterthought. Too
often, advocates seem willing to accept the prevailing standard of
review without recognizing the policy rationales underlying the stan-
dard or attempting to challenge the standard with countervailing
concerns that might lead to more or less deference. Behind the la-
beling stand important and often unarticulated decisions based on
policy that can only be examined by the appellate court when prop-
erly presented with thoughtful advocacy and argument. Getting to
the bottom of the subject requires not merely labeling the issue as
110. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, however, has held that a federal ap-
pellate court should review the findings of a federal trial court only for clear error.
See United States v. Baldwin, 60 F.3d 363 (7th Cir. 1995). The court stated:
Mi!ler held that 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which requires federal courts in
habeas corpus proceedings to presume that state courts' "factual" findings
are correct, is inapplicable to the issue of voluntariness.... This is a differ-
ent matter from whether a federal court of appeals should review de novo a
determination of voluntariness made not by a state judge in a state trial but
by a federal district judge in a federal trial. Since the relation between
federal and state courts and the relation between federal appellate and fed-
eral trial courts are not symmetrical, the two questions need not be an-
swered the same way. Miller is designed to provide a state prisoner with
generous federal review of the constitutional question whether he was con-
victed with the aid of a coerced confession. It has nothing directly and, as it
seems to us at any rate, very little indirectly to do with the scope of appel-
late review of determinations made by federal judges.
Id. at 364; see also Keith R. Dolliver, Comment, Voluntariness of Confessions in
Habeas Corpus Proceedings: The Proper Standard for Appellate Review, 57 U. On.
L. REv. 141 (1990).
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one of "fact" or "law," but also a thorough analysis of why a certain
level of deference is "better" in a particular case.
IV. THE MAINE LAW COURT AND STATE QUESTIONS
The Maine Law Court has also had the opportunity to address the
meaning of standards of review through their application to particu-
lar cases involving state legal issues. A review of the use of identi-
cally-termed standards of review can illuminate policy decisions that
exist in different subject areas of the law. These cases also show that
"fact" and "law" are terms defined by policy and not their inherent
natures. Once again, the labeling of the issue as "fact" or "law" is
driven by practical considerations that must be seized by advocates.
Three Law Court cases are instructive.
A. Willis Realty Associates v. Cimino Construction Co.
In Willis Realty Associates v. Cimino Construction Co.,"' the Law
Court concluded that a provision of a standard American Institute
of Architects (AIA) form construction contract barred subrogation
recovery between Willis Realty and Cimino Construction. Willis
Realty, a partnership owning property in Portland, leased a building
to Maine Printing that was constructed in 1980 by Cimino Construc-
tion."' The building was originally designed to incorporate an addi-
tion, and in 1986, Willis Realty contacted Cimino to build that
addition." 3 The parties signed a standard AIA contract that in-
cluded a provision that the owner and Cimino "waive all claims for
damages 'to the extent covered by insurance obtained pursuant to
this [contract] or any other property insurance applicable to the
work.""' 4 Willis Realty and Cimino later amended the contract to
require the contractor, Cimino, to maintain property risk insurance
on the entire work." 5 In October of 1986, a collapse in the rear of
the existing building occurred during excavation for the addition,
and Royal Globe, the insurer for Willis Realty and Maine Printing,
covered the losses." 6 Although Cimino procured coverage pursu-
ant to the amended contract on November 1, 1986, any prior dam-
age to the property was excluded under the terms of the insurance
contract."
7
Royal Globe, as the insurer of both Willis Realty and Maine
Printing, filed suit against Cimino Construction to recoup its losses.
The focus during trial was whether the contractual waiver of the
111. 623 A.2d 1287 (Me. 1993).
112. See id at 1288.
113. See id.
114. Id. (quoting the language of the AIA contract).
115. See id
116. See id.
117. See id.
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subrogation provision applied to these circumstances. As the dis-
sent indicates, the court admitted extrinsic evidence to determine
the intent of the parties regarding the applicability of this provi-
sion."' 8 Following a jury-waived trial, the superior court granted a
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs against Cimino and concluded
that the subrogation provision did not apply against any of the
plaintiffs.119
On appeal, Cimino argued in part that the court erred as a matter
of law in concluding that the claims of Willis Realty and Maine
Printing were not barred by the contractual waiver of subrogation
provision. The Law Court agreed that the claim against Willis Re-
alty was barred. First, the court noted that the interpretation of "an
unambiguous written contract.., is a question of law."I The court
also stated that whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law,
and "[o]nly when the language of a contract is ambiguous or uncer-
tain is its interpretation a question of fact to be determined by the
factfinder."' 2 The majority concluded that, as a matter of law, the
contract "bars subrogation recovery between the parties to the con-
tract for damages to the extent covered by insurance."Pm
Willis Realty argued that the court's finding of the inapplicability
of the contractual provision was subject to review only for clear er-
ror' and that position garnered support in Justice Clifford's dis-
sent. Justice Clifford concluded that the waiver provision was not
applicable to the claims pursued in the names of Willis Realty and
Maine Printing. He stated that "[t]his Court reviews the trial court's
decision de novo, and construes the contract as a matter of law. The
trial court, however, did not decide the case as a matter of law
S.. "I Instead, the dissent noted that the trial court had resorted
to the admission of extrinsic evidence to determine the parties' in-
tent regarding the applicability of the waiver in this case. Relying
on that fact, the dissent concluded that "[i]n the case of this contract
that I would conclude is ambiguous, that factual determination
should be reviewed for clear error, and I find no such error."'  In
one light, this case revolves around the determination of whether
the intent of the parties could be termed a matter of "law" or a
118. See id. at 1290 (Clifford, .1, dissenting).
119. See id. at 1288.
120. Id. (citing Hopewell v. Langdon, 537 A.2d 602, 604 (Me. 1988)).
121. Id. (citing F.O. Bailey Co. v. Ledgewood, Inc., 603 A.2d 466, 468 (he.
1992)).
122. Id. at 1289.
123. Brief of Appellee at 5-6, Willis Realty Assocs. v. Cimino Constr. Co., 623
A.2d 1287 (Me. 1993) (CUM-92-119).
124. Willis Realty Assocs. v. Cimino Constr. Co., 623 A.2d at 1290 (Clifford, J.,
dissenting).
125. Id.
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matter of "fact." What divided the court, however, was the act of
labeling the issue as one of "law" or one of "fact."
B. Fourier v. Rochambeau Club
In Fournier v. Rochambeau Club,126 the Law Court concluded
that the finder of fact did not err in determining that the Rocham-
beau Club's negligence resulted in an injury to Fournier. Fournier, a
long-standing member of the Rochambeau Club, often helped the
club prepare the kitchen on beano nights.127 Preparations included
readying pre-formed hamburger patties for cooking. Although the
patties were usually thawed, they were still frozen one night in Feb-
ruary of 1988. 2 s An agent of the club instructed Fournier to sepa-
rate some of the frozen patties but did not provide him with
instructions on how to accomplish this task.129 Using a knife,
Fournier sliced his thumb.130
Fournier sued the club alleging that it negligently failed to instruct
him on how to properly separate the hamburgers. The court, in a
jury-waived trial, found that the club was negligent and that the neg-
ligence was a proximate cause of Fournier's injuries.13 On appeal,
the club argued that any breach of its duty of care was not the proxi-
mate cause of Fournier's injury.132 The Law Court majority dis-
agreed and noted that "the finder of fact determined that the club's
direction that Fournier separate the frozen patties, coupled with its
failure to instruct him on the proper method of achieving that end,
were both an inadequate protection from a reasonably foreseeable
harm and a substantial factor in bringing about that harm." 33 The
court held that the trial court's finding that the negligence was a
proximate cause of Fournier's injury was not erroneous as a matter
of law.13 In addition, the majority concluded that the trial court's
finding that the club was more negligent than Fournier was not a
cause for reversal: "[T]he assessment of the relative causative fault
of the parties regarding liability is in the instant case a determina-
tion properly left to the court in its role as trier of fact. ' 135 Given
that the trial court's findings were factual ones, the Law Court could
have stated explicitly that the findings were not clearly erroneous.
126. 611 A.2d 578 (Me. 1992).
127. See id. at 579.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. Id.
134. See id
135. Id.
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Justice Clifford dissented and sided with the club.' He empha-
sized that Fournier was not using a "complex piece of machin-
ery. '13 7 He was "an intelligent adult, who had worked in the
Rochambeau Club's kitchen for two years, [and] was given the task
of separating frozen hamburger patties. He chose to use a common
kitchen knife. He was familiar with the techniques for using such a
knife safely .... He cut his own hand."'13 He concluded that "as a
matter of law, and of common sense, [the negligent conduct of
Fournier was clearly equal to or greater than the negligent conduct
of the club.]' 1 9
C. Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Hancock
In Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Hancock,"4 Hancock brutally
beat and raped the victim, referred to in the opinion as Jane Doe,
over several hours. Although the two people at one time had a rela-
tionship, it had deteriorated. 4 ' On the night of the attack, Hancock
had been drinking and wanted to talk to Doe. When she refused to
speak with him, the attack commenced. 4 Hancock hit Doe over
several hours with a closed fist, broke several bones, and raped her.
Hancock subsequently pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and
gross sexual assault.14
Doe brought a civil action against Hancock seeking damages for
injuries resulting from Hancock's conduct.1" Hancock was insured
by Mutual Fire Insurance Company pursuant to a policy that denied
coverage for "bodily injury or property damage ... which is ex-
pected or intended by the insured."14 s Mutual defended Hancock,
but additionally filed a declaratory judgment action alleging that
Hancock was not covered pursuant to the policy for these acts.'
The court heard both cases together in a jury-waived trial and deter-
mined that Mutual owed Hancock a duty to defend and indemnify.
The trial court concluded that Hancock's "acts were not committed
intentionally or knowingly. They were committed without any con-
scious awareness. His mental state was at best reckless." 47
On appeal, Mutual should have argued that the issue of Han-
cock's mental state was at least a mixed question of fact and law and
136. See id. at 580 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. 634 A.2d 1312 (Me. 1993).
141. See id. at 1312.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 1312-13.
144. See id. at 1313.
145. Id
146. See id.
147. Id
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that the issue should be reviewed de novo. Mutual, however, in-
stead labeled the issue as "fact" and attempted to show that the fac-
tual findings were clearly erroneous1 48 Hancock, with the judgment
in his favor, agreed that the issues were "factual," and argued that
the court did not clearly err in its decision.
The Law Court reversed the trial court's ruling. The court con-
cluded that "[a]s a matter of law, a systematic, hours-long brutal
beating is not a 'reckless' act; it can only be intentional and the inju-
ries resulting from expected.' 149 The court reiterated that the trial
court had found as a matter of "fact" that Hancock had repeatedly
hit Doe with a closed fist, had forced sexual intercourse with her,
and choked her to keep her from screaming. Nevertheless, the court
noted, the trial court found that Mutual did not meet its burden of
proving that the injuries were expected or intended because of Han-
cock's intoxication at the time of the commission of the acts.150 The
court concluded that, as a matter of law, a person could not ac-
cidently hit another person repeatedly or submit someone to sexual
intercourse. 15' The court concluded that by proving these acts oc-
curred, Mutual had proved that the injuries were, as a matter of law,
intended or expected. Thus, Mutual had no duty to defend or in-
demnify Hancock in his civil suit.' 52
Justice Glassman dissented. 5 She believed that the trial court
had correctly labeled the issue of Hancock's mental state as a matter
of "fact." Based on that characterization, she dissented because she
concluded that "the Court not only fails to grant proper deference
to the Superior Court in its factflnding role, but also determines that
as a matter of law the issue is precluded from litigation in the pres-
ent civil action."'54 After canvassing the facts that the trial court
found, she noted that factual findings are overturned on appeal only
if they are clearly erroneous. 155 She then stated:
In this case, while a reasonable factfinder might have reached
a different conclusion than that of the trial court, there is am-
ple evidence in the record to support the trial court's finding
on this issue. Accordingly, it cannot be said as a matter of law
that the trial court erred in so determining.156
Thus, Justice Glassman labeled the issue as one of "fact" and ac-
cordingly applied a clear error analysis.
148. See id.
149. Id.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See id. (Glassman, J., dissenting).
154. Id.
155. See id. at 1314.
156. Id. (citing Founier v. Rochambeau Club, 611 A.2d 578, 579 (Me. 1992)).
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These three cases "characterized" the particular issues; the court
did not, however, determine the essential nature of them. First, a
comparison of Fournier and Willis Realty reveals a battleground for
choosing particular standards of review. In Willis, a question existed
about the interpretation of a contract and the intent of the parties
regarding one of its provisions. A majority of the Law Court la-
beled the issue as one of "law" in which the trial court would receive
no deference. The majority in Fournier, however, labeled the ques-
tions of proximate cause and comparative negligence as issues of
"fact" that were better left to the "court in its role as trier of
fact."1" Neither decision, however, garnered a unanimous court.
The choice of label foretold the outcome in these cases, yet more
than mere labeling was occurring. Indeed, the battle so vocally
waged in front of the United States Supreme Court is also fought at
the Law Court. The court in Fournier found it better to style rela-
tive fault and causation as questions of "fact," but in Willis Realty
found more utility in determining that contractual interpretation
was a question of "law." The reasons behind these decisions should
occupy legal study and advocacy. When advocates transcend the
long-held belief that "fact" and "law" are inherently discernable cat-
egories, they open for themselves a new world of advocacy, argu-
mentation, and an eye into the very heart of the law.
What policies are at work here? Why did the Law Court label as
it did? Perhaps the court feels more competent to interpret con-
tracts than weigh fault, even if extrinsic evidence was admitted to
interpret the contract, and the court made a factual determination
on appeal. Perhaps the court wanted to encourage appeals in cases
like Willis and discourage them in cases such as Fournier. After all,
significantly more was at stake in Willis than in Fournier. In both
cases, insurers were left to compensate the injured parties for their
losses. Did the court feel that the losses in these cases-expenses
for an injury to a finger and for the collapse of an existing wall-
were better absorbed by the parties who were expected to cover
them, the Rochambeau Club and Royal Globe Insurance?
Just as Willis Realty can be compared with Fournier, so may Mu-
tual Fire be compared with either of them. The court labeled the
issue as one of "law" because it had persuasive reasons for doing so.
Uncovering and arguing those reasons leads to more effective appel-
late advocacy of standards of review. A comparison of Fournier and
Mutual Fire, however, reveals deeper problems with the rationale of
the Law Court in this area. Ideally, the court should first decide
how a particular issue is to be labeled, i.e., as "fact" or "law," and
what policy considerations lead to the particular characterization of
the issue. After the issue is labeled, then the merits of the appeal
should be examined. Was there clear error on this record? How
157. Fournier v. Rochambeau Club, 611 A2d at 579.
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should the issue of "law" be decided? In Fournier and Mutual Fire,
however, the Law Court collapsed the individual components of a
standard of review issue. The court decided the entire case without
indicating how the issue was labeled, why that label was used, or
how it applied in this particular case. If the issue is labeled as one of
"fact," then Rule 52(a) of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure
should be applied on appeal to determine whether the findings are
clearly erroneous. If the issue is labeled as one of "law," then Rule
52(a) has no application at all and the court is free to decide the
legal issue de novo. In Fournier and Mutual Fire, the court, at least
in the opinions, skipped the first step and simply decided the legal
issue, leaving the reader to work backwards to determine the stan-
dard of review that the court actually applied.
These cases expose the fallacies surrounding standards of review.
They were not decided because the question involved was inevitably
one of "fact" or "law." Instead, the Law Court applied a standard
of review based on unarticulated policy decisions. These labels are
not out there somewhere in our collective consciousness waiting to
be revealed. They are conclusions wrought from policy considera-
tions. The policies at work expose an area for debate and allow a
view into the inner workings of the legal process. Our legal minds
should be turned to these inner workings of standards of review.
V. CONCLUSION
For a long time now, commentators and courts have labored to
apply standards of review based on whether an issue "is" one of
"fact" or one of "law." Both groups have attempted to discover for-
mulas for identifying and distinguishing factual issues from legal
ones. The goal of this Article is to stop this futile search.
We must abandon this way of thinking about standards of review.
Justice Jackson once said that one "who must search a haystack for a
needle is likely to end up with the attitude that the needle is not
worth the search."' 58 Justice Jackson's prediction seems particularly
appropriate in the area of standards of review. The metaphysical
attempt to define the separate universes of "facts" and "laws" is a
misguided and impossible adventure. Nothing is inherently "fact"
or "law," and we should stop trying to define that for which no defi-
nition exists. The search for the a priori understanding of "fact" and
"law" is the search for a chimera, and thus a waste of the time and
resources of lawyers and judges.' 59
158. Brown v. Alien, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
159. See Hofer, supra note 3, at 251. Hofer states that "[t]he law loses nothing by
ignoring or abandoning the old labels, as long as appellate courts give reasons for
according or not according deference to particular lower tribunal determinations."
Id.
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The cases discussed in this Article demonstrate that the reasoning
behind the labeling is the important first step in the analysis. There
is a better language to use when speaking about standards of review.
The United States Supreme Court has illuminated the notion that
policies define the labeling of issues. Policy rationales indicate that
in different situations, different judicial actors are better able to de-
cide the issue in question. For instance, the Ornelas Court was per-
suaded by policy arguments favoring a non-deferential review of
investigatory stop issues, and it determined that the appellate court
was best positioned to decide whether articulable suspicion or prob-
able cause existed. The holding in Bose Corp. can be explained by
the Court's unwavering protection of rights guaranteed by the First
Amendment and the need for an appellate court to check decisions
impacting those rights. In Miller, the Court labeled the issue of vol-
untariness as one of "law" in order to protect due process rights.
The lesson of these cases is not that this or that issue is inherently
"factual" or "legal," but instead that policy rationales persuaded the
Court to apply a particular standard of review to a certain issue.
The Law Court engages in the same process, but with less fanfare.
Although the Law Court has not had as many opportunities to ex-
amine deeply the application of standards of review to certain is-
sues, it also makes decisions based on policy. The substantive law
invariably drives the court to choose different levels of deference.
Advocates must embrace, understand, and argue policy rationales
based on the substantive law at issue in order to have a positive
effect on the jurisprudence of standards of review.
The cases discussed in this Article demonstrate that lawyers are in
a position to advocate for a particular standard of review, rather
than merely accepting the propriety of a standard of review and ap-
plying it to the facts of a case. An advocate seeking a deferential
standard of appellate review for an issue has a duty to marshal pol-
icy arguments in her favor. Likewise, one arguing for de novo re-
view ought to be prepared to justify why an appellate court must
pore over the entire trial record when a trial judge has already done
so. If precedent is hopelessly against a lawyer, perhaps an appeal is
a waste of time and money for the client. On the other hand, once
practitioners realize that standards of review are largely debatable
issues, a new universe of concerns is revealed for future examination
and study, argumentation and analysis, and finally, judicial debate
and decision.
Standards of review exist so that the legal process may work effi-
ciently and fairly. A general definition of efficiency and fairness,
however, is impossible. The answer depends on the issue, the back-
ground, the "facts," and the creativity of the lawyers involved in the
case. In examining standards of review, advocates must understand
that the terms "fact" and "law" carry no magic of their own; instead,
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their substantive meaning depends on an examination of case law,
issues, and their attendant policy concerns. Properly argued and de-
cided, the standard of review may control the outcome of a case. At
the very least, a standard of review seeks to clarify the scope of the
case before an appellate court and to inform that court of the pa-
rameters of its appellate function. At the very most, standards of
review represent the substance and life of the law.
